Standing on Unsteady Ground: AREVA NP  Incorporated in France v Eskom SOC LTD by van Eetveldt, Henri-Willem
H VAN EETVELDT  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  1 
 
 
Abstract 
 Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 
2017 6 BCLR 675 (CC) was a dispute over a multi-billion-rand 
tender. Although the majority of the Constitutional Court 
recognised the public importance of the case, it adjudicated the 
dispute entirely on a preliminary point. It found that the applicant 
did not have legal standing to seek the judicial review of the 
award of the tender. 
This case note has three aims. First, I will argue that the 
Constitutional Court's majority judgment in Areva was generally 
unpersuasive. Second, I will attempt to show that Areva exposes 
an unresolved legal question: when should a court consider the 
merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing? 
Third, I will propose a method for resolving this question by way 
of substantive judicial reasoning in any given case. 
Keywords 
Locus standi; legal standing; public-procurement; tender-dispute; 
substantive reasoning; transformative adjudication.  
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1 Introduction 
Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd1 was a dispute 
over a multi-billion-rand2 tender. Although the majority of the Constitutional 
Court recognised the public importance of the case,3 it adjudicated the 
dispute entirely on a preliminary point. It found that the applicant in the court 
of first instance, Westinghouse Electric Belgium Société Anonyme 
(hereafter referred to as Westinghouse), did not have legal standing to seek 
the judicial review of the award of the tender.4 
This case note has three aims. First, I will argue that the Constitutional 
Court's majority judgment in Areva was generally unpersuasive. Second, I 
will attempt to show that Areva exposes an unresolved legal question: when 
should a court consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with 
questionable standing? Third, I will propose a method for resolving this 
question in any given case. I start by briefly considering the development of 
the law on legal standing, as this provides the context for the ensuing 
discussion. 
2 A broadened approach to legal standing 
Legal standing determines whether a particular litigant is entitled to 
approach a court for relief.5 It is a tool a court uses to determine if a litigant 
"is entitled to claim its time, and to put the opposing litigant to trouble."6 To 
obtain legal standing, a litigant must meet two overarching requirements: he 
must have the capacity to litigate, and a sufficient interest in the matter 
before the court.7 The sufficient-interest requirement is generally of greater 
concern to litigation with a public-law dimension.8 This is exemplified by the 
facts in Areva: no one challenged Westinghouse's capacity to litigate; 
however, it was contentious whether it satisfied the sufficient-interest 
                                            
* Henri-Willem van Eetveldt. BA BA(Hons) LLB LLM (Stellenbosch University). 
Advocate, member of the Johannesburg Bar. E-mail: hve@counsel.co.za. 
1 Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2017 6 BCLR 675 (CC) 
(hereafter referred to as Areva). 
2 Areva para 4. 
3 Areva para 27. 
4 Areva para 42. 
5 Giant Concerts CC v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd 2013 3 BCLR 251 (CC) para 34 
(hereafter referred to as Giant Concerts). 
6 Giant Concerts para 41. 
7 Hoexter Administrative Law 487. 
8 Baxter Administrative Law 644; Hoexter Administrative Law 487. 
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requirement. As such, I consider only the sufficient-interest requirement in 
this note. 
Under common law before 1994, a litigant would have legal standing only if 
he had a sufficient, direct, and personal interest in the matter before the 
court.9 A court would recognise that the litigant possessed such an interest 
only if the litigant was personally adversely affected by the impugned act.10 
It would not suffice to show that the impugned act harmed the public in 
general: there had to be a personal nexus between the litigant and the 
impugned act.11 
Our common law thus allowed only a narrow range of persons to be heard 
by the courts. Moreover, particularly in administrative-law disputes, courts 
were prone to apply the rules on standing formalistically.12 The common law 
on standing was therefore doubly restrictive: its rules were stringent and its 
judicial approach was narrow.13 
Section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter the Constitution) and its predecessor, section 7(4) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter the 
Interim Constitution) introduced a "radical departure"14 from the common 
law on standing. Section 38 of the Constitution states: 
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and 
the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The 
persons who may approach a court are –  
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their  
own name; 
                                            
9 Hoexter Administrative Law 488-489; Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 
73; Budlender and Webber "Standing and Procedure for Judicial Review" 222. 
10 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 73. 
11 Baxter Administrative Law 654. Although Roman law recognised a range of "popular 
actions" which clothed a litigant with standing to vindicate the public interest, these 
actions expired in Roman-Dutch law. See Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 
372 380; Wood v Ondangwana Tribal Authority 1975 2 SA 294 (A) 308B-C. The only 
exception was the interdictum de libero homine exhibendo. This remedy, the 
equivalent of the English writ of habeas corpus, was directed at freeing a person 
from unlawful detention. See Wood v Ondangwana Tribal Authority 1975 2 SA 294 
(A) 308F-310G. See also, Swanepoel 2014 De Jure 65-66. 
12 Hoexter 2008 SAJHR 288. 
13 For a notable exception, see Jacobs v Waks 1992 1 SA 521 (A) 534B-E.  
14 Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) para 14. 
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(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
It is plain from the text of section 38 that the Constitution affords standing to 
litigants that are not personally adversely affected by the law or conduct 
they impugn. Section 38(c), for instance, allows a litigant to act in the interest 
of a class of persons, while section 38(d) allows a litigant to act in the 
interest of the public at large. This is clearly a departure from the common-
law position. 
The Constitution not only expanded the rules on standing, but it also 
expanded the approach courts should use to interpret and apply those rules. 
In Ferreira v Levin; Vryenhoek v Powell,15 the Constitutional Court (per 
Chaskalson P) held: 
Whilst it is important that this Court should not be required to deal with abstract 
or hypothetical issues, and should devote its scarce resources to issues that 
are properly before it, I can see no good reason for adopting a narrow 
approach to the issue of standing in Constitutional cases. On the contrary, it 
is my view that we should rather adopt a broad approach to standing. This 
would be consistent with the mandate given to this Court to uphold the 
Constitution and would serve to ensure that Constitutional rights enjoy the full 
measure of the protection to which they are entitled.16 
In a separate concurring judgment, O'Regan J explained the rationale for 
this broadened judicial approach. O'Regan J pointed out that the common-
law rules on standing developed in the context of private litigation, which 
involves disputes between private individuals. Generally, such litigation 
does not affect people that are not parties to the dispute before the court.17 
In litigation with a public dimension, however, the relief sought may affect a 
wide range of people who are not parties to the dispute, and the alleged 
harm may "be quite diffuse or amorphous".18 Although O'Regan J was 
careful not to construct an artificial binary distinction between private and 
public litigation,19 she pointed out that section 7(4) of the Interim Constitution 
                                            
15 Ferreira v Levin; Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) (hereafter referred to as 
Ferreira v Levin). 
16 Ferreira v Levin para 165. 
17 Ferreira v Levin para 229. 
18 Ferreira v Levin para 229. 
19 Ferreira v Levin para 229G-H. 
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broadened the law on standing specifically to accommodate public 
litigation's unique features.20 
Section 38(a) of the Constitution regulates the standing of a litigant acting 
in its own interest. This ground of standing was particularly relevant in 
Areva, as Westinghouse averred that it was acting in its own interest. 
Section 38(a) appears to reiterate the common-law standard for establishing 
own-interest standing.21 But, as confirmed by Cameron J in Giant Concerts, 
the standard for own-interest standing under section 38(a) is much broader 
than the common-law standard.22 Cameron J explained, with reference to 
Ferreira v Levin,23 that although an own-interest litigant must show that the 
impugned act directly affects his or her interests or potential interests, it is 
unnecessary to demonstrate the personal nexus that the common law 
required.24 
Cameron J reiterated that the own-interest-standing requirement must be 
broadly interpreted.25 He held that court should keep in mind that standing 
is "not a technical or strictly-defined concept", that there is "no magical 
formula for conferring it", and that it should be determined pragmatically with 
reference to the facts of the case before the court.26 
Cameron J also held that a court should consider questions of standing 
before it engages with the merits of the case.27 This has important 
consequences.28 It means that standing is not determined by the merits of 
a legal challenge, but rather with the relationship between the challenge and 
the interests of the party seeking to make it. As such, an own-interest litigant 
may be denied standing even if this means that irregular conduct is 
obscured from judicial scrutiny.29 
But the separation between standing and merits is not absolute. Cameron 
J indicated that there may be cases where a court will consider the merits 
                                            
20 Ferreira v Levin para 229H. 
21 Hoexter Administrative Law 492. 
22 Giant Concerts para 41. 
23 Cameron J also referred to Minister of Home Affairs v Eisenberg & Associates: In re 
Eisenberg & Associates Minister of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 281 (CC); Kruger v 
President of Republic of South Africa 2009 1 SA 417 (CC). 
24 Giant Concerts para 41. 
25 Giant Concerts para 41. 
26 Giant Concerts para 41. 
27 Giant Concerts para 32. 
28 Giant Concerts paras 33-34. 
29 Giant Concerts para 34. 
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of a challenge brought by a litigant with questionable standing.30 According 
to Cameron J: 
[T]he interests of justice under the Constitution may require courts to be 
hesitant to dispose of cases on standing alone where broader concerns of 
accountability and responsibility may require investigation and determination 
of the merits.31 
For reasons I will explain below, I am of the view that this proposition is 
particularly relevant to Areva, and raises questions that the law on standing 
does not currently answer. I refer to the proposition as the "Giant-Concerts 
exception" for ease of reference.32 I will now consider Areva, starting with 
the background to the dispute. 
3 Background to the dispute in Areva 
Areva was a dispute about a tender for the replacement of steam generators 
in the Koeberg nuclear power station.33 The periodic replacement of these 
generators is vital to the sustainability of South-Africa's electricity 
resources.34 Eskom SOC Ltd (hereafter referred to as Eskom), the organ of 
state responsible for the power station, was of the view that it was a nuclear 
safety priority that the generators had to be replaced by 2018.35 
In 2012 Eskom called for expressions of interests to replace the 
generators.36 Two companies responded to Eskom's satisfaction: 
Westinghouse and Areva NP Incorporated in France (hereafter referred to 
as Areva).37 Eskom allowed both companies to submit bids.38 It evaluated 
the bids rigorously.39 It ultimately decided to award the tender to Areva.40 
Westinghouse initiated litigation in the High Court shortly thereafter.41 It 
sought the judicial review of Eskom's decision to award the tender to Areva. 
It also sought a substitution order, i.e. that the tender be awarded to it.42 
                                            
30 Giant Concerts para 34. 
31 Giant Concerts para 34. 
32 It is an "exception" in the sense that it is a departure from the rule that a court will 
only consider the merits of a legal challenge made by a litigant with standing.  
33 Areva para 4. 
34 Westinghouse Electric Belgium SA v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2016 3 SA 1 (SCA) 
para 6 (hereafter Areva SCA). 
35 Areva SCA para 6. 
36 Areva para 5. 
37 Areva para 6. 
38 Areva para 7. 
39 Areva SCA paras 8-30. 
40 Areva para 12. 
41 Areva para 13. 
42 Areva para 13. 
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Westinghouse essentially averred that Eskom awarded the tender to Areva 
on the strength of criteria outside the bid-evaluation criteria set out in the 
tender documents.43 According to Westinghouse, this was an irregularity 
that made Eskom's decision reviewable on several grounds under the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter referred to as 
the PAJA).44 
Both Eskom and Areva opposed Westinghouse's application on the merits. 
Unlike Eskom, Areva also disputed Westinghouse's legal standing. Areva 
argued that Westinghouse had not submitted its own bid but had submitted 
a bid as an agent of another company, Westinghouse Electric Company 
LLC (hereafter referred to as Westinghouse USA). As Westinghouse was 
not a bidder, Areva argued, Westinghouse did not have a sufficient interest 
to impugn Eskom's decision to award the tender to Areva.45 
Both the High Court46 and the Supreme Court of Appeal47 found that 
Westinghouse had legal standing. 
4 Judgment of the Constitutional Court 
4.1 The relationship between Westinghouse and Westinghouse USA 
Before the Constitutional Court Areva persisted with its challenge to 
Westinghouse's standing. Westinghouse maintained that it had standing to 
impugn Eskom's decision because it had submitted its own bid.48 As far as 
its relationship with Westinghouse USA was concerned, Westinghouse 
averred that it merely received the "support" of Westinghouse USA,49 as 
both Westinghouse USA and it belonged to the Westinghouse group of 
companies. 
The majority of the Constitutional Court, in a judgment authored by Zondo 
J, accepted Areva's argument. It found that Westinghouse was the agent of 
                                            
43 Areva SCA paras 3, 34-37; Areva para 73. 
44 Areva SCA paras 47-65; Areva para 73. 
45 Areva para 22. 
46 Westinghouse Electric Belgium SA v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd (GJ) (unreported) 
case number 2014/35650 of 2 April 2015 paras 27-28 (hereafter referred to as Areva 
GJ). 
47 Areva SCA paras 66-70. 
48 Areva para 33. 
49 Areva para 37. 
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Westinghouse USA and that Westinghouse did thus not have a sufficient 
interest in Eskom's decision to award the tender to Areva.50 
It seems that the majority found that Westinghouse was the agent of 
Westinghouse USA after narrowly parsing minute detail in the documentary 
evidence. It seems to have relied almost exclusively on the following phrase, 
which appeared in one sentence of a letter sent by Westinghouse to Eskom: 
Westinghouse Electric Belgium on behalf of Westinghouse Electric Company 
LLC is pleased to submit the present offer to Eskom.51 
The majority was admirably conscientious in its attention to detail. But it may 
have been so narrowly focussed on evidentiary minutiae that it failed to 
adopt a broad approach to the facts. The majority held, for instance, that if 
the abovementioned letter did not show that Westinghouse was an agent of 
Westinghouse USA, "then nothing will".52 Perhaps that is so. But this does 
not exclude the possibility that there could be equally compelling 
countervailing evidence. Yet the majority treated the letter as if it excluded 
the possibility of such evidence. 
There were also factual indications that Westinghouse was a bidder in its 
own right. These were considered by the minority, which took a broader, 
pragmatic approach to the facts. Beside the fact that Westinghouse said on 
affidavit that it was a bidder, the minority also took into account that during 
the bid-evaluation process Westinghouse and Westinghouse USA acted in 
concert. It also took into account the fact that Eskom never doubted that 
Westinghouse would replace the steam generators.53 While the majority 
saw the abovementioned letter as proof that Westinghouse was the agent 
of Westinghouse USA, the minority saw the letter as showing only that "a 
party may have mixed up its corporate identity within the litigating 
multinational group of companies".54 
Now, if Westinghouse submitted a bid as an agent of Westinghouse USA, 
the majority was correct to reject Westinghouse's argument that its interests 
as a bidder were affected by Eskom's decision: if Westinghouse submitted 
a bid as an agent, it could not have submitted the same bid in its own right.55 
                                            
50 Areva paras 31-36. 
51 Areva para 34. 
52 Areva para 34. 
53 Areva para 58. 
54 Areva para 61. 
55 The general rule is that an agent does not have a legal interest in the acts it performs 
for its principal. For instance, if the agent concludes a contract for its principal, it 
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But the majority could perhaps have done more to explain the ambit of its 
factual finding. It seemed to imply that Westinghouse failed because – as a 
rule – only bidders have own-interest standing to challenge tender awards. 
It held, for example, that as Westinghouse was not a bidder, Eskom's 
decision to award the tender to Areva could not possibly have adversely 
affected Westinghouse's interests or potential interests.56 But it is arguably 
not a rule that only a bidder will have own-interest standing to challenge the 
award of a tender. For example, a litigant may challenge a tender precisely 
because an organ of state failed to provide the litigant with a fair opportunity 
to submit a bid for the tender.57 
It would have been useful if the majority made this clear. This would have 
reduced the possibility of confusion in future cases. It would also have 
emphasised that, as far as legal standing in a public-procurement case is 
concerned, the key question is whether a litigant has a sufficient interest in 
the impugned act, and not whether the litigant was a bidder or not. 
Focussing on whether a litigant was a bidder or not facilitates a narrow 
approach to standing. This is not the approach that the Constitution 
demands.58 
The majority was dismissive of the fact that Westinghouse and 
Westinghouse USA belonged to the same group of companies. It pointed 
out that even if the two companies belonged to the same company-group, 
they remained separate legal entities with their own rights and obligations.59 
Thus, if Westinghouse USA acquired rights and obligations because it 
submitted a bid, those rights and obligations would not be shared by 
Westinghouse simply because Westinghouse also belonged to the 
                                            
cannot personally sue or be sued under the contract. The agent can also not sue or 
be sued as the representative of the principal, unless the principal authorises the 
agent to represent it in that capacity. On the general rule, see Waikiwi Shipping Co 
Ltd v Thomas Barlow and Sons (Natal) Ltd 1978 1 SA 671 (A) 680D. However, the 
general rule is subject to several exceptions. A pertinent exception is that an agent 
may sue personally where he has a special interest in the subject matter of a contract 
he concludes for the principal. See Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co 
of Chicago v Greek Seamen's Pension Fund 1989 2 SA 515 (D) 538H-542C. It falls 
beyond this note's reach to discuss the law of agency in any detail. 
56 Areva para 36. 
57 See, for example, Secureco (Pty) Ltd v Ethekwini Municipality (KZD) (unreported) 
case number 1100/2015 of 1 April 2016. 
58 Ferreira v Levin para 165. 
59 Areva paras 37-38. 
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Westinghouse group of companies.60 In this regard, the majority stressed 
that "[t]he issue here is about legal entities".61 
Hence the majority applied the principle of separate juristic personality. The 
principle is, of course, a cornerstone of our company law.62 But the principle 
has less significance in the context of legal standing than the majority 
appears to have believed. In my view, in emphasising that "[t]he issue here 
is about legal entities", the majority oversimplified the legal position. As I 
see it, the issue at root was not that Westinghouse and Westinghouse USA 
were different companies. The issue at root was that Westinghouse failed 
to explain how its interests aligned with Westinghouse USA in respect of the 
tender. The fact that Westinghouse was not the same company as 
Westinghouse USA did not, in principle, preclude such an explanation. It 
would all depend on the relationship between the companies, and whether 
this relationship gave Westinghouse a sufficient interest in Eskom's decision 
to award the tender to Areva. In insisting that "[t]he issue here is about legal 
entities", the majority seems, curiously, to have evoked the common-law 
requirement of a personal nexus between the litigant and the act it seeks to 
challenge. 
The majority thus found that Westinghouse lacked legal standing to impugn 
Eskom's decision to award the tender to Areva. This may have been the 
correct outcome. The majority appears, however, to have oversimplified the 
law on legal standing in reaching the outcome. This could lead to confusion 
in future cases dealing with a litigant's own-interest standing to challenge 
the award of a public tender. 
4.2 The Giant Concerts exception 
The majority proceeded to find that the Giant Concerts exception did not 
apply to the facts in Areva.63 It found, in other words, that because 
Westinghouse lacked standing it would not be justifiable to assess the 
merits of its claim. The majority's reasoning for this finding occurs in one 
paragraph, which I quote in full for ease of reference: 
It seems to me that, part of what this Court held in Giant Concerts was that, 
where a litigant has failed to show that it has standing, the Court should, as a 
general rule, dispose of the matter without entering the merits and that it 
should only enter the merits in exceptional cases or where the public interest 
really cries out for that. It does not appear to me that this is a case which cries 
                                            
60 Areva paras 37-38. 
61 Areva para 39. 
62 See generally, Cassim Contemporary Company Law 31-65. 
63 Areva paras 40-41. 
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out for that. In saying this, I am not suggesting that on the merits the challenge 
is necessarily without merit but I do so because: (a) the two bidders appear to 
have been neck and neck in the competition for the tender; (b) both bidders 
were accepted as technically capable of doing the job properly; and (c) time 
is of the essence in regard to the installation and replacement of the steam 
generators and, if the steam generators are not installed and replaced on time, 
there may be severe consequences for the country in regard to nuclear 
energy. Furthermore, Areva has been working on the project for the past two 
years and there is not much left before the time by when the installation and 
replacement of the generators is required to have been completed. 
I read this paragraph as containing three distinct reasons for the conclusion 
that the Giant Concerts exception did not apply to the facts in Areva. I will 
discuss each reason in turn. In my respectful view, none of the reasons are 
persuasive. 
4.2.1 Areva and Westinghouse were evenly-matched bidders 
The majority held that the Giant Concerts exception was not applicable 
because Areva and Westinghouse were "neck and neck in the competition 
for the tender",64 and both companies were technically competent to replace 
the steam generators. In making these statements, the majority could have 
been saying at least two different things. 
The majority could have meant that the case did not "cry out" for relief 
because Areva and Westinghouse were evenly-matched bidders. In terms 
of this line of reasoning, the case would presumably have "cried out" for 
relief if Areva had been an inferior bidder or if it had been incapable of 
replacing the steam generators. 
If this is indeed what the majority meant, it overlooked an important principle 
of law: in determining a litigant's standing, a court must assume that the 
litigant's complaints about the impugned act are correct.65 According to 
Westinghouse, its bid was some R140 000 000 cheaper than Areva's bid.66 
Although R140 000 000 is far less than the value of the contract between 
Eskom and Areva, which is approximately R5 000 000 000,67 it is still a 
significant amount of money. If Westinghouse's bid was more cost-effective 
by R140 000 000, the dispute in Areva did, in my view, "cry out" for relief. 
But perhaps all of this misses what the majority actually meant. The majority 
could also have meant this: Areva and Westinghouse were equally 
                                            
64 Areva para 41. 
65 Jacobs v Waks 1992 1 SA 521 (A) 536A; Giant Concerts para 32. 
66 Areva SCA para 4. 
67 Areva GJ para 2. 
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deserving of the tender. So if the impugned decision were remitted to Eskom 
– and if Eskom again decided to award the tender – it would not necessarily 
award the tender to Westinghouse. Hence Westinghouse could not get the 
substitution order it sought68 and its challenge was therefore academic.69 
If this is indeed what the majority meant, its reasoning was unsound for two 
reasons. First, Westinghouse did not only seek a substitution order – it also 
asked the court to set aside Eskom's decision to award the tender to 
Areva.70 Even if Westinghouse could not get the substitution order it sought, 
a court could still order that Eskom's decision be set aside. This is what the 
Supreme Court of Appeal did, for instance.71 Accordingly, even if 
Westinghouse's prayer for a substitution order was academic, this did not 
mean its entire application was academic. 
Second, if the majority considered whether Westinghouse was entitled to a 
substitution order, this is something it should have considered during the 
remedy stage of its enquiry. The enquiry into standing precedes the enquiry 
into the merits, and each enquiry turns on different considerations.72 
Equally, the enquiry into merits precedes the enquiry into the appropriate 
remedy, and both enquiries again attract different considerations.73 The 
enquiry into a remedy is therefore twice removed from the enquiry into 
standing. As such, the majority should not have conflated the question 
whether Westinghouse had an interest in the tender with the question 
whether the tender should be awarded to Westinghouse. 
                                            
68 In Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of Southern 
Africa Ltd 2015 5 SA 245 (CC) paras 34-59, the Constitutional Court confirmed that 
a substitution order under s 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of the PAJA is an extraordinary remedy. 
The Constitutional Court held that the remedy should be granted only where two 
related factors are both present. First, the court should be in as good a position as 
the administrator to make the impugned decision. Second, if the administrator had 
to make the impugned decision again, it would have to be a foregone conclusion that 
the administrator would make the decision in favour of the party seeking the 
substitution order. A court may thereafter consider other relevant factors and must 
ultimately decide whether it would be just and equitable to grant the substitution 
order. 
69 An interest is "academic" where it is not related to a real or practical situation. See 
Giant Concerts para 51. 
70 Areva para 2. 
71 Areva SCA para 80. 
72 Hoexter Administrative Law 488; Giant Concerts para 33. 
73 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 
(CC) para 84; AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive 
Officer, South African Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) paras 24-26, 56 
(hereafter referred to as AllPay 1). 
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4.2.2 Time was of the essence 
The majority held that the Giant Concerts exception was not applicable 
because the steam generators had to be replaced timeously, as a delay 
would endanger the public.74 This is obviously a compelling reason. But the 
problem, as pointed out by the minority,75 is that it is an equally good reason 
for considering Westinghouse's case on the merits. 
If Westinghouse failed on standing alone – and if it failed on standing simply 
because it cited the wrong party as the applicant – it might have been 
motivated to make a new application in the name of Westinghouse USA. A 
fresh application could have protracted the dispute even further. It would 
thus have been prudent to ensure that fresh litigation did not occur. One 
way of doing this would have been to adjudicate Westinghouse's case once 
and for all. 
4.2.3 Areva had already started performing the tender 
Finally, the majority held that the Giant Concerts exception did not apply 
because Areva had already started performing the tender.76 The majority 
did not explain its reasoning here. It simply stated that Areva had "been 
working on the project for the past two years" and the deadline for the 
completion of its work was imminent.77 I assume the majority meant that 
Westinghouse's application was academic, because even if the majority 
found the decision to be invalid, it would use its discretion to preserve the 
contract between Eskom and Areva.78  
If that is indeed what the majority meant, it again conflated the remedy-
enquiry with the standing-enquiry. Whether Eskom's decision should be set 
aside is a question to be considered in the remedy-enquiry. It is twice 
removed from the question that animates the standing-enquiry, namely 
whether Westinghouse was an appropriate litigant to challenge Eskom's 
decision. 
                                            
74 Areva para 41. 
75 Areva para 62. 
76 Areva para 41. 
77 Areva para 41. 
78 For examples of public-procurement cases where courts have been willing to use 
their discretion in this way, see Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee v JFE 
Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 2 SA 638 (SCA); Moseme Road Construction CC 
v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd 2010 4 SA 539 (SCA). But compare 
Eskom Holdings Ltd v New Reclamation Group (Pty) Ltd 2009 4 SA 628 (SCA). 
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5 When should a court consider the merits of a case made 
by a litigant with questionable standing? 
5.1 Introduction 
So far I have focussed on the Constitutional Court's majority judgment in 
Areva. I have argued that the judgment oversimplified the law regulating the 
legal standing of the own-interest litigant. I have further argued that the 
majority's reasoning was unpersuasive in deciding that the Giant Concerts 
exception did not apply to the case at hand. 
My focus now shifts to the Giant Concerts exception itself. I will attempt to 
show that the meaning of the Giant Concerts exception is unsettled. I will 
argue, in other words, that it is unclear when a court should consider the 
merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing. I will finally 
propose a method for dealing with this unresolved legal question. 
5.2 Three interpretations 
In Areva, the majority of the Constitutional Court held that the Giant 
Concerts exception applies only where "the public interest really cries out 
for that".79 For ease of reference, I will call this "the crying-out interpretation". 
According to the crying-out interpretation, a court will consider a case made 
by a litigant with questionable standing only if the case is obviously 
exceptional. It is doubtful whether such a restrictive interpretation is 
congruent with the broad approach to standing that the Constitution 
demands. However, there is some indication that the Giant Concerts 
exception was indeed designed to be restrictive. This can be found in the 
penultimate paragraph of Giant Concerts, where Cameron J wrote: 
When a party has no standing, it is not necessary to consider the merits, 
unless there is at least a strong indication of fraud or other gross irregularity 
in the conduct of a public body.80 
In Tulip Diamonds FZE v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
("Tulip Diamonds"),81 the Constitutional Court read this proposition and the 
Giant Concerts exception together. The Court in Tulip Diamonds held, in 
other words, that the Giant Concerts exception applied only where there is 
a strong indication of fraud or other gross irregularity by the organ of state 
                                            
79 Areva para 41. 
80 Giant Concerts para 58. 
81 Tulip Diamonds FZE v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 2 
SACR 443 (CC) (hereafter referred to as Tulip Diamonds). 
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concerned.82 This is a further indication that the Giant Concerts exception 
should be read restrictively. For ease of reference, I will call this "the Tulip 
Diamonds interpretation". 
It is doubtful whether the Tulip Diamonds interpretation is cogent. It blends 
two propositions from Giant Concerts. The first proposition, which appears 
at paragraph 34 of Giant Concerts, is about a litigant with questionable 
standing.83 The second proposition, which appears 24 paragraphs later, is 
about a litigant with no standing.84 These propositions are formally and 
substantively different. It is therefore questionable whether the 
Constitutional Court in Tulip Diamonds should have read the propositions 
together.  
It is also noteworthy that in Areva the Constitutional Court did not refer to 
the Tulip Diamonds interpretation at all. This is a strange oversight. But 
perhaps it means that that the Tulip Diamonds interpretation has little 
precedential influence. 
In contrast to the Tulip Diamonds interpretation and the crying-out 
interpretation, the minority in Areva interpreted the Giant Concerts 
proposition as laying down a flexible standard. According to the minority, 
the import of the Giant Concerts exception is that a court will consider the 
merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing where it is in 
the interests of justice to do so.85 For ease of reference, I will call this "the 
open-ended interpretation". 
Under the open-ended interpretation, a court has a wide discretion to decide 
whether it should consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with 
questionable standing. In exercising this discretion, the minority considered 
several factors that the majority failed to take into account. I briefly mention 
the two factors that are, to my mind, the most significant. 
5.2.1 Private litigation versus public litigation 
Unlike the majority, the minority took into account that Areva was not simply 
a commercial dispute between private entities, but that it was a public-
procurement dispute.86 A dispute of this nature attracts broader concerns of 
accountability: a contract flowing from a public-procurement process is 
                                            
82 Tulip Diamonds para 45. 
83 Giant Concerts para 34. 
84 Giant Concerts para 58. 
85 Areva paras 57, 60-62. 
86 Areva para 61. 
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concluded "not on the state entity's behalf, but on the public's behalf".87 The 
public has an interest in public procurement because it "palpably implicates 
socio-economic rights".88 
In this regard, the minority could perhaps have emphasised that Areva 
concerned a particularly sensitive public-procurement dispute. As 
mentioned above, it concerned a five-billion-rand service that was crucial to 
the sustainability of the country's power grid and had to be performed as a 
nuclear safety priority. 
The minority could also have engaged with the distinction between private 
litigation and public litigation, as discussed by O'Regan J in Ferreira v 
Levin.89 The dispute in Areva may have seemed like private litigation: 
Westinghouse, a private company incorporated in Belgium, wanted a 
lucrative tender that Eskom awarded to Areva, a private company 
incorporated in France. But in substance it was public litigation. If Eskom 
awarded the tender to Areva irregularly, the resultant harm may have been 
"quite diffuse or amorphous"90 and may have affected not only 
Westinghouse but the public at large. The fact that Areva concerned public 
litigation underscores why a broad approach should have been used to 
assess Westinghouse's legal standing. 
5.2.2 The function of the Constitutional Court 
Unlike the majority, the minority also considered the role of the 
Constitutional Court as a factor guiding the application of the Giant Concerts 
exception. Commenting on the majority judgment, Moseneke DCJ wrote: 
In my view, the judgment would have been stronger if, after disposing of the 
standing point, it went further to say: 'In any event, the appeal on the merits is 
without substance.' This approach speaks to an apex court that will not lightly 
look away at a potential injustice only because a party may have mixed up its 
corporate identity within the litigating multinational group of companies.91 
This is an intriguing statement, as it evokes the debate about the function 
of the Constitutional Court.92 I cannot participate in the debate here, except 
to note that one's views on the function of the Constitutional Court will likely 
correlate with one's views on the meaning of the Giant Concerts exception. 
                                            
87 AllPay 1 para 56. 
88 AllPay 1 para 4. 
89 See section 2 above. 
90 Ferreira v Levin para 229. 
91 Areva para 61. 
92 See, for instance, Currie 1999 SAJHR 138-165; Roederer 1999 SAJHR 486-512; 
Fowkes 2013 CCR 309-330; Cachalia 2017 SAJHR 138-153. 
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If one believes that the Constitutional Court functions primarily to adjudicate 
the dispute between the parties before it, one would likely give a cautious 
reading of the Giant Concerts exception. However, if one believes that the 
Constitutional Court is also responsible to provide guidance on 
constitutional issues – even if litigants present those issues to the Court 
abnormally or in a procedurally deficient way – one would likely give a 
generous reading of the Giant Concerts exception. 
5.3 Formal and substantive reasoning 
What underlies these different interpretations of the Giant Concerts 
exception? The most plausible explanation, in my view, is that the 
interpretations are produced by different approaches to adjudication itself. 
This difference in approach can be articulated in terms of a distinction that 
has gained currency in South-African legal theory: the distinction between 
formal and substantive reasoning.93 This distinction originates from Atiyah 
and Summers' well-known comparative study of the American and English 
legal systems.94 On the basis of the distinction, Atiyah and Summers build 
a theory of adjudication the details of which I will not discuss here, as that 
would require an entire article on its own. For the purpose of this note I thus 
merely outline their general proposition in broad terms. 
According to Atiyah and Summers, a substantive reason is a "moral, 
economic, political, institutional, or other social consideration."95 A formal 
reason is a "legally authoritative reason on which judges and others are 
empowered or required to base a decision or action."96 Formal reasons seek 
to oust countervailing substantive reasons.97 For example, a substantive 
reason for the delay rule in administrative law is that it promotes legal 
certainty.98 A formal reason for the delay rule is that the PAJA commands 
that judicial-review proceedings must be instituted without unreasonable 
                                            
93 Alfred Cockrell (Cockrell 1996 SAJHR 1-38) was one of the first to use this distinction 
to analyse the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence. The distinction is popular in the 
growing literature on the idea of transformative adjudication. For some of the most 
well-known contributions on this topic see, for instance, Moseneke 2002 SAJHR 
309-319; Hoexter 2004 SALJ 598-599; Froneman 2005 Stell LR 3-20; Hoexter 2008 
SAJHR 281-299; Quinot 2010 CCR 111-139; Hoexter 2015 SALJ 207-229. It falls 
beyond the scope of this note to itemise or discuss every contribution on the topic. 
94 Atiyah and Summers Form and Substance 1-41. 
95 Atiyah and Summers Form and Substance 1. 
96 Atiyah and Summers Form and Substance 2. 
97 Atiyah and Summers Form and Substance 2. 
98 Wolgroeiers Afslaers (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Kaapstad 1978 1 SA 13 (A) 
41E-F; Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2010 1 SA 333 (SCA) para 
33. 
H VAN EETVELDT  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  18 
delay and within 180 days.99 From a purely formal point of view, then, if 
there has been a delay of 181 days there has been a legally prohibited 
delay, even if the delay has not created any legal uncertainty. 
Drawing from Atiyah and Summers' analysis, several authors have argued 
that the post-apartheid Constitutional era demands a shift from a formal to 
a substantive "vision" of the law, in which substantive reasoning is favoured 
over formal reasoning.100 This "vision" does not require formal reasoning to 
be abandoned or established rules of law to be disregarded. Rather, it 
entails that, where courts apply formal rules, they should do so consistently 
with the substantive reasons underlying the rules.101 
In the foregoing discussion I have attempted to illustrate that the majority 
judgment in Areva is characterised by a high degree of formal reasoning, 
while the minority judgment embraces substantive reasoning. In my view, 
the minority's substantive reasoning was more consistent with the broad 
approach to standing that the Constitution demands. The broad approach 
to standing is a matter of positive law, having been confirmed on numerous 
occasions since Ferreira v Levin.102 There is no set of instructions for 
applying the approach, but it seems to flow from the very idea of a broad 
approach that it should be applied by way of substantive reasoning. 
Substantive reasoning could also provide guidance on the import of the 
Giant Concerts exception. To date, courts have tried to ascertain the 
meaning of the exception by interpreting propositions from Giant Concerts. 
This exegesis is unlikely to yield a unanimous answer, as illustrated by the 
Tulip Diamonds interpretation, the crying-out interpretation, and the open-
ended interpretation respectively. Of course, the Constitutional Court could 
simply state the meaning of the Giant Concerts exception by way of an 
unequivocal rule-like pronouncement, but this might undermine another 
proposition Cameron J asserted in Giant Concerts, namely that "there is no 
                                            
99 Section 7(1) of the PAJA. 
100 Cockrell 1996 SAJHR 7-9; Froneman 2005 Stell LR 3-5; Hoexter 2008 SAJHR 285-
286; Quinot 2010 CCR 111. 
101 Quinot 2010 CCR 116. 
102 See, for instance, De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local 
Division 2002 6 SA 370 (W) para 16; FirstRand Bank Ltd v Chaucer Publications 
(Pty) Ltd 2008 2 SA 592 (C) para 23; Freedom Under Law v Acting Chairperson: 
Judicial Service Commission 2011 3 SA 549 (CC) para 23; Savoi v National Director 
of Public Prosecutions 2014 5 SA 317 (CC) para 10; Giant Concerts para 41. 
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magical formula" 103 for determining questions of standing, as each case 
turns on its own facts.104 
It may be more productive for courts to perform the following two-step 
procedure in substantive reasoning to determine whether the Giant 
Concerts exception should apply in a particular case. 
The first step is to determine what the substantive reasons are for limiting 
legal standing. In other words, a court should ask why we have rules on 
legal standing at all. The second step is to determine whether the underlying 
substantive reasons apply to the case at hand. In other words, a court 
should ask whether the underlying substantive reasons are good reasons 
for limiting a litigant's access to court in the case at hand.105 
If the underlying reasons do not apply to the case at hand, this means that 
there are no substantive reasons for limiting the litigant's access to court. If 
there are no substantive reasons for limiting a litigant's right of access to 
court, it would be sensible to apply the Giant Concerts exception. Stated 
differently, it would be formalistic to maintain a strict barrier between the 
standing-enquiry and the merits-enquiry in circumstances whether the 
underlying reasons for a restriction on standing have dissolved. If there are 
minimal substantive reasons for maintaining the barrier but there are 
forceful countervailing reasons for removing it – such as indications of fraud, 
gross irregularity, and broader concerns of accountability and transparency 
– a court may also be inclined to apply the Giant Concerts exception. 
To show what this two-step exercise looks like in practical terms, I will now 
perform it on the facts of Areva. I will focus on three well-known justifications 
for limiting legal standing. 
5.3.1 The floodgates-of-litigation justification 
A popular justification for limiting legal standing is the floodgates-of-litigation 
argument.106 The argument, simply put, is that courts will be overburdened 
by unmeritorious claims if legal standing is unlimited. The Constitutional 
                                            
103 Giant Concerts para 42. 
104 Giant Concerts para 42. 
105 It seems that the Constitutional Court used a similar method in Ferreira v Levin para 
164. 
106 Baxter Administrative Law 645; Hoexter Administrative Law 489-490. 
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Court has expressed a similar idea by saying that it "should devote its 
scarce resources to issues that are properly before it".107 
The floodgates argument finds no traction in Areva. As noted above, Areva 
was a public-procurement dispute. As far as these disputes are concerned, 
the floodgates are apparently already open. In 2010 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal noted that courts "are swamped with unsuccessful tenderers that 
seek to have the award of contracts set aside and for the contracts to be 
awarded to them."108 As far as I am aware the flood of public-procurement 
litigation has not subsequently abated. So, if the Giant Concerts exception 
applied to the facts in Areva, this would not have opened the floodgates of 
litigation. 
Furthermore, even if applying the Giant Concerts exception in Areva would 
somehow have opened the floodgates of litigation, it is debatable whether 
this would have been a bad thing. Because public-procurement disputes 
invariably attract broader concerns of accountability and transparency, it is 
perhaps desirable that such disputes are often subjected to judicial scrutiny. 
In the words of Pickering J, "it may sometimes be necessary to open the 
floodgates in order to irrigate the arid ground below them."109 
The resource-scarcity argument also does not work in the context of the 
dispute in Areva. This is because the Constitutional Court in fact devoted its 
scarce resources to the case. It considered the parties' affidavits and other 
court papers,110 it heard the parties' submissions, including their 
submissions on the merits,111 and it produced two judgments. If the majority 
applied the Giant Concerts exception, its only remaining work would have 
been to write the additional paragraphs dealing with the merits of 
Westinghouse's case. It is unlikely that this would have been an onerous 
additional burden on the Constitutional Court's resources. 
                                            
107 Ferreira v Levin para 41 n 69. 
108 Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd 2010 
4 SA 359 (SCA) para 1. 
109 Wildlife Society of Southern Africa v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
of the Republic of South Africa 1996 3 SA 1095 (TkS) 1106; Hoexter Administrative 
Law 491. 
110 Areva paras 10-11, 17-21.  
111 Areva para 61. 
H VAN EETVELDT  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  21 
5.3.2 The best-litigant justification 
A further justification for limiting legal standing is the best-litigant 
argument.112 According to this argument, legal standing ensures that cases 
are presented to courts by litigants that are best equipped to do so, and this 
reduces the possibility that judges are faced with inchoate claims by 
vexatious litigants.113 
From the judgment in Areva there is nothing to indicate that Westinghouse 
was not the best-placed litigant, or at least as well placed as Westinghouse 
USA. It seems that Westinghouse presented a comprehensive, rigorously-
argued case. Hence the best-litigant rationale is also not applicable to the 
facts in Areva. 
5.3.3 The justiciability justification 
A final justification for limiting legal standing is that it enables the judiciary 
to maintain its independence from the other branches of the state.114 The 
justification, in other words, is that courts can use legal standing to dispose 
of cases that are not justiciable.115 This justification clearly has no 
application to the facts in Areva, because it is trite that public-procurement 
disputes are justiciable.116 
In summary, none of the main justifications for limiting legal standing apply 
to the facts in Areva. In my view, this is a good reason for concluding that, 
even if Westinghouse had questionable legal standing, it would have been 
justifiable to consider the merits of its application. 
5.3.4 Final remarks about the two-step procedure 
Two remarks about the two-step procedure are called for in closing. 
The first remark is that the procedure is not intended to be a "jurisprudential 
slot-machine"117 that automatically generates the outcome of a case. The 
procedure does not intend to overlook the complexities in adjudication. Nor 
does it call for less analytic rigour in judicial decision-making. Instead it 
                                            
112 Baxter Administrative Law 645; Hoexter Administrative Law 490; Budlender and 
Webber "Standing and Procedure for Judicial Review" 221. 
113 Baxter Administrative Law 645; Hoexter Administrative Law 490. 
114 Budlender and Webber "Standing and Procedure for Judicial Review" 221. 
115 Hoexter Administrative Law 490. 
116 See, for instance, Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 
121 (CC) paras 21-22; AllPay 1 paras 4, 25. 
117 Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 34. 
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seeks to be a method for aligning adjudication in legal-standing cases with 
the broad approach demanded by the Constitution. 
The second remark is about the rationale for the two-step procedure. The 
reader may ask: if I have argued for substantive over formal reasoning, what 
substantive reason do I propose for the two-step procedure itself? 
The short answer to this question is that the two-step procedure works. That 
is to say, the two-step procedure provides a practical means of using 
substantive reasoning to decide whether the Giant Concerts exception 
should apply to the facts of a case. The procedure works because it is easy 
to understand, easy to replicate, and makes it virtually impossible to avoid 
substantive reasoning if used correctly. 
The fact that the two-step procedure works might strike one as a flimsy 
justification: just because something works does not, of course, mean that 
it is good. Moreover, the fact that something "works" does not really sound 
like a "moral, economic, political, institutional, or other social consideration", 
which is Atiyah and Summers' definition of a substantive reason.118  
But the fact that the two-step procedure works is significant in the light of 
the fact that the legal position is currently unworkable. There are currently 
three co-existing procedures for deciding whether the Giant Concerts 
exception should apply to the facts of a case, and it is not clear which 
procedure is, or should be, predominant.119 This multiplicity of competing 
procedures makes the legal position vague and unpredictable. 
This basic and down-to-earth justification for the two-step procedure may 
come as a surprise and may even strike one as ironic. This is because 
pragmatic justifications, like certainty and expediency, are ordinarily 
justifications for formal and not substantive legal reasoning.120 But the point 
here is that such pragmatic justifications are still substantive justifications 
(they are called "second-level substantive reasons" by Atiyah and 
Summers),121 and they are justifications which are rooted in the 
Constitution. As the Constitutional Court has stated: 
Whilst it may not be easy 'to avoid the influence of one's personal intellectual 
and moral preconceptions', this Court has from its very inception stressed the 
fact that 'the Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean'. 
Cases fall to be decided on a principled basis. Each case that is decided adds 
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119  See the discussion under paragraph 5.2 above. 
120 Atiyah and Summers Form and Substance 21. 
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to the body of South African constitutional law and establishes principles 
relevant to the decision of cases which may arise in the future.122 
6 Conclusion 
I have made three arguments in this note. 
The first argument is that the majority judgment in Areva was generally 
unpersuasive. The majority seems, at times, to have oversimplified the legal 
position. Moreover, in finding that the Giant Concerts exception did not 
apply to the facts in Areva, its reasoning was unconvincing. 
The second argument is that the import of the Giant Concerts exception is 
not clear. In other words, it is unclear when exactly a court should consider 
the merits of a case made by an own-interest litigant with questionable 
standing. This is evidenced by co-existence of the Constitutional Court's 
crying-out interpretation, the Tulip Diamonds interpretation and the open-
ended interpretation. 
The final argument is that this gap in the law should be filled by the two-step 
procedure. This entails identifying the substantive reasons for limiting legal 
standing, and then deciding whether those reasons apply to the facts of the 
case at hand. The main benefit of this procedure is in my view that it is 
congruent with the broad approach to legal standing that the Constitution 
demands. 
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